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Panel for ILEC IV – Philosophical Legal Ethics: Ethics, Morals and Jurisprudence
Is it possible to rescue the concept of role-differentiated morality from the seemingly
devastating criticisms leveled at the “standard conception” of legal ethics as amoral
lawyering? The famous question posed by Charles Fried, “Can a good lawyer be a good
person?” accepted the premise that “good lawyers” are professionally obligated to
pursue the interests of their clients even when doing so would "use the law to the
prejudice of the weak or the innocent" and detract from the common good. Fried argued
that the lawyer’s role as partisan advocate for her clients is morally justified by the
relationship between the person and the legal system; each of us should be free to pursue
lawful purposes, and can indeed claim a right to be free to act as we choose within the
“bounds of the law”.
Some legal ethicists who initially responded to Fried (or like Wasserstrom wrote
contemporanteously with him) argued that the idea of legal boundaries provides
inadequate protection against the harm lawyers cause others in the pursuit of their
clients' interests. Partisan duty infuses the way lawyers interpret the "bounds of the law,"
pushing legal limits past their ordinary meaning and intended purpose to embrace any
colorable interpretation that the law could sustain.
Other legal ethicists have rejected the premise that lawyers’ ethical duties demand
instrumentalist partisan interpretation of the “bounds of the law,” and have looked
increasingly to jurisprudential and political theory to explore the interpretive stance that
it is appropriate for lawyers to take with respect to the "bounds of the law." This reanimation of the debate in philosophical legal ethics has motivated more general
scholarly interest and attention.
Our proposal is to engage the questions about the theoretical basis of legal ethics in the
form of a roundtable discussion between participants who represent both the moral
critiques of the standard conception and those who seek to rehabilitate it on grounds of
jurisprudential or political theory, with audience participation. To make the discussion
focused and engaging, participants will each provide a 3-5 page (no more!) paper on a
question related to the evolving discipline of philosophical legal ethics (below). The
papers will be distributed shortly before the conference, and at the conference each
participant will have 5-10 minutes to discuss their views. That will then be followed by
an open discussion/question and answer session between the participants and the
audience.
Is the concern of legal ethics the morality of lawyers, the morality of clients, or the
morality of laws?
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Panel for ILEC IV – Philosophical Legal Ethics: Ethics, Morals and Jurisprudence
Tim Dare
Is it possible to rescue the concept of role-differentiated morality from the seemingly devastating criticisms
leveled at the “standard conception” of legal ethics as amoral lawyering? I’ve offered a defence of a
modified version of the standard conception of the lawyer’s role that answers ‘yes’ to at least a (moralized)
version of this question.
The critique of the current reading of the standard conception is wide ranging and claims at least that:
o

lawyers acting under the standard conception are alienated from ordinary morality,

o

are invited to deny responsibility for the things they do (and so to deny their status as moral
agents, capable of choosing to do otherwise),

o

are rendered morally insensitive in ways which impair their ability both to live a satisfactory life
outside of their professional roles and to perform their professional roles adequately

o

are likely to find their work deeply unsatisfying because of the sometimes striking discord
between the apparently obvious concern of law and lawyers with justice and morality, and the
reality of practice under a conception which separates the moral obligations of the lawyer from
those of the rest .

In the face of that critique, commentators have, in various ways, sought to make the lawyer’s role more
directly amenable to the demands of ordinary morality. I argue that that is a mistake: that a modified
version of the SC is essentially the right way of conceiving of the ethical obligations of lawyers.
My overall strategy is straightforward. I argue that lawyers have moral grounds for regarding
themselves as having duties to their clients which may allow or require them to act in ways which would be
immoral were they acting outside of their professional roles (so I’m not very keen on the description of this
as an ‘amoral role’: I think it’s a deeply moral, albeit morally autonomous, role). Roughly, I rely an
account of the role of law in modern liberal communities according to which its primary function is to
mediate between reasonable but inconsistent views about what we ought to do, and in which it does that by
allocating rights to settle ‘what will we do’ questions, without purporting to settle ongoing debate about
what we ought to do.

1

If the moral justifications of the lawyer’s role can be defended, many of the

criticisms of the standard conception fall away. Most generally, if there are moral reasons for taking the
standard conception seriously, then we should not too readily accept the claim that the conception alienates
lawyers from morality, or overdraw the conception's break between ‘personal’ or ‘ordinary’ morality on the
one hand and professional morality on the other. An adequate personal or ordinary morality will entail a
proper respect for the moral demands and permissions of professional roles.
1

Conceiving of law in terms of this role leads me to have doubts about Dworkinian accounts of the role of principles in
judicial reasoning. I think such accounts undercut the capacity of law to mediate between reasonable but inconsistent
views about how we should live. Even if one accepts some such account in judicial contexts, where judges are required
to give reasons and are subject to appeal and review, however, it seems more troubling to encourage lawyers to adopt
the approach given the absence of opportunity for public review.

Electronic copy available at: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1646558
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The moral argument also suggests a solution to the crisis of morale. I argue that the standard conception
recognises the vulnerability of clients within client/professional relationships, and that contemporary liberal
communities rely to a considerable extent upon the practice of law as conceived by the standard
conception. Law so practiced allows people who are committed to a range of diverse but reasonable views
about how we should live to form stable and just communities. The lawyer’s role so conceived is one in
which lawyers should take a good deal of satisfaction. The crisis of morale that troubles so many
commentators is attributable, I suggest, to a failure to appreciate the moral justification for the role rather
than to any general licensing of immoral professional conduct.
Further, once the moral arguments for the standard conception are made explicit, those arguments
themselves suggest limits to the things lawyers may justifiably do within their professional roles. The
moral implications of the standard conception are often mischaracterised. Commentators suggest that the
conception requires lawyers to secure any advantage the law can be made to give: to be what I call hyperzealous and many of the most trenchant criticism of the SC flow are responses to hyper-zeal. But I argue
that the standard conception, understood in light of its proper moral justification, requires no such thing: It
justifies a more limited and moderate sphere of professional conduct than is commonly supposed, requiring
lawyers to be what I have called mere-zealous, zealously pursuing only their clients’ legal entitlements (as
opposed to mere advantages).

2

The idea, put in the terms of the panel question, is that restricting

legitimate advocacy to mere-zeal will go some way toward reducing the “use the law to the prejudice of the
weak or the innocent” and addressing the interpretation of “partisan duty” which leads lawyers to “interpret
the “bounds of the law” [in ways which lead them to] push legal limits past their ordinary meaning and
3

intended purpose to embrace any colorable interpretation that the law could sustain”.

In addition, I argue, the model I defend allows us to conceptualize an important feature of ethical legal
practice. I make use of John Rawls’ distinction between constitutive and practice rules to defend the claim
that role differentiated obligation are possible, and to show how an institution and the roles it supports
might be designed with reference to the resources of broad based morality and yet it be the case that the
occupants of those institutional roles are not at liberty to appeal to broad based morality from within their
roles. Rawls’s model allows us to maintain a ‘clean break’ between role morality and broad based morality
without making it the case that standards of ordinary morality have no place in the evaluation of
2

It may seem (perhaps correctly!) that this feature of the model requires a theory interpretation, to explain how lawyers
are to know when an advantage offered by a rule is a ‘right’ or a ‘mere advantage’. For the moment, I am inclined to
think the objection is not too troubling. I offer the analogy of the jurisdiction to prevent ‘abuse of process’. Abuse of
process is defined functionally: an abuse is the use of legal proceedings for purposes other than those for which those
processes were intended. Identifying abuses requires just the sort of reasoning through the point of laws and legal
processes which I argue underpins the distinction between ‘legal rights’ and mere advantages’. So, for the moment at
least, I offer an ostensive response to the interpretative objection: “How do we draw the distinction? Like that!”.
3
The distinction between mere-zeal and hyper-zeal leads me to reject at least a simple version of the idea, attributed
Fried in the question for the panel, that “each of us should be free to pursue lawful purposes, and can indeed claim a
right to be free to act as we choose within the “bounds of the law”. We need to spell out ‘lawful purposes’ more
carefully. Some of our purposes are lawfully only ‘accidentally’ or ‘collaterally’ and, on my account, we cannot always
insist on the help of lawyers to pursue such purposes. Thinking about this recently, I wonder whether the merezeal/hyper-zeal distinction (or the legal right/lawful advantage distinction which underpins it) might be supported by
Hohfeldian analysis, though I have not got very far with that project.

4
4

professional conduct. Conceptualizing the lawyer’s role in these Rawlsian terms, this is to say, contributes
to the argument, alluded to in the previous paragraph, that the break between role morality and ordinary
morality should not be overdrawn.
It also has another function. According to the model, a lawyer noticing, for instance, that a statute of
limitations or current rules or practices of cross examination have produced results regrettable from the
perspective of ordinary morality cannot act, qua advocate, other than the existing rules of the practice
recognize. The role is constituted by those rules and the actions available to her are settled by the role. I
have argued however, that the model allows us to see more clearly than we otherwise might, how role
occupants are able to move between roles. The relevant move here is between the roles of advocate and
‘reformer’. The Rawlsian model makes very clear how and why we might conceive of lawyers as subject to
an obligation to work to improve the fit between role and ordinary morality where, in some respect, the
institution, built with reference to the resources of ordinary morality, has come apart from ordinary
morality. Qua advocate, lawyers, confronted with such a case will normally have to stick with their clients,
helping the client secure their rights under the law. When the client’s case is complete, however, the lawyer
may well bear a responsibility to take on the role of law-reformer, arguing for reform which their legal
expertise and familiarity with the particular case may have made especially clear.

Some of the most troubling strands of the critique of the standard conception raise concerns about
the ways in which the conception calls upon professionals to distance themselves from their lay-persona,
from the claims of ordinary morality, from the circumstances in which they act, from the people they
engage with when acting as role-occupants, and so sacrifice their integrity. I attempt to addresses these
concerns about integrity on a number of fronts. As a conceptual matter, I defend an account of integrity
according to which it rests on a commitment to critical reflection upon one’s role(s) and a readiness to
follow the implications of that reflection. My (immodest) hope is that I can tie this account of integrity to
my substantive account of the lawyer’s role by suggesting that some such account should be accepted by
the reflective lawyer. The account addresses the substantive threats to integrity in a number of ways: it
seeks to minimize the conflict between the demands of role morality and those of ordinary or broad based
morality by limiting the excesses of advocacy; it offers a model of professional roles which, while insisting
on a ‘clean break’ between role morality and broad based morality, nonetheless recognizes the contribution
of ordinary morality at the point of institutional design; it offers a moral argument for the particular role
differentiated demands of the lawyer’s role, suggesting that there are reasons of ordinary morality to take
those demands seriously; and it shows that lawyers have a professional moral obligation to engage in a
constant process of law reform, aimed at promoting fit between the lawyer’s role morality and broad based
morality.

4

Using Rawls’ distinction in this way requires a response to Arthur Applbaum’s powerful argument that the distinction
in fact shows us that the conduct of role occupants cannot (without some fancy moves involving enduring descriptions)
be the subject of moral criticism from outside the role.

5
I don’t imagine any of this amounts to a knock-down response to the critique of the standard
conception, – or that there is not more which needs to be addressed (an account of the conditions for
legitimate conscientious objection, for instance). I think it goes some way to responding to the critique of
the standard conception, though, and so supports a ‘yes’ to the panel question.

6
Katherine Kruse
William S. Boyd School of Law, University of Nevada, Las Vegas

When I was a senior in college, I faced a moral dilemma: I wanted desperately to go to
graduate school, but I did not think it was possible for me to be a good philosopher and a
good person. After drifting through the first two years of college, I had withdrawn from
school and spent a year supporting myself as a cook and a bank teller. During that year, I
encountered people with various kinds of trouble—from criminal charges to immigration
problems—and I came to see myself as privileged. I also came to understand that if
properly directed, my natural intelligence could position me make a tangible difference in
the lives of others. I went back to school because I saw education as a tool that would
enable me to help people less fortunate than myself; I had decided to become a lawyer.
When I returned to college and engaged in my studies with this new sense of
purpose, I fell accidentally in love with the study of philosophy. With all the suffering in
the world, I did not think I could morally justify devoting my life to the academic pursuit
of abstract ideas, but I made what I perceived at the time to be a selfish choice: I went to
graduate school because I couldn't deny myself the opportunity to follow my passion.
Within two years, my moral values caught up with me, and I transferred to law school. A
formative experience was attending a talk by an appellate public defender about what he
did for a living: he said he lost about ninety percent of his cases, but he went to prison
every month and listened to the stories of prisoners--mostly young black men whose lives
society had thrown away--and that his job was to tell their stories in ways that would
make people listen and care. After graduating from law school, I followed a path similar
to his. It took another eleven years of working and teaching in a prison legal assistance
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clinic for me to realize that to fully flourish as a person, I needed to find a way to honor
my passion for academics as well as my moral impulsion to put my talents to use in
concrete service to others.
This story from my life helps explain a couple of things about my answers to the
questions about legal ethics and the morality of lawyers, clients and the law. First, the
question of whether a good lawyer can be a good person has never been very interesting
to me, because the answer has always seemed so obviously to be “yes.” The question of
how one can best use one’s expertise and social position as a lawyer (or philosopher or
real estate agent or salesperson) to improve the lives of others and to add value to the
world is much more interesting, but I don't see it as central to legal ethics. In my view,
we all face that question as persons, not as lawyers. Second, my own experiences make
me acutely aware how complicated moral reasoning is: how difficult it is to understand
and prioritize our own values; how easy it is to rationalize selfish impulses; how often
our duties to ourselves and others conflict; how difficult it is to define our duties to the
common good; and how what seems right (or wrong) in the moment may utterly fail the
test of time.
The answers to which I gravitate in legal ethics are essentially client-centered. In
part, this is because the morally problematic behavior of over-zealous partisanship has
never struck me as a problem of lawyers who weigh their duties to clients too heavily.
Such partisanship occurs too infrequently among lawyers whose clients are unable to pay
handsomely for hourly work; and it is received with too much suspicion by even wellheeled clients when they get their billing statements. Social scientists almost invariably
view lawyers as jockeying for status and protecting their own interests rather than putting
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their clients' interests at the forefront: classic examples include Blumberg's analysis of
plea bargaining as a "confidence game";5 Sarat & Felstiner's study of the way divorce
lawyers talk to their clients;6 and Langevoort & Rasmussen's model explaining why
business lawyers "skew the results" by overestimating legal risk.7 I am inclined to view
the "adversary system excuse" as a mask behind which lawyers hide the pursuit of their
own interests at the expense of their clients and the public, a perversion of lawyers’
partisan duties rather than a fulfillment of them. To address the problem of overzealous
partisanship, in my view, partisanship must be conceptualized to curb lawyer self-interest
and put clients more truly at the center of legal representation.
With respect to the morality of clients, my view is that lawyers should facilitate
their clients' sound moral decision-making.8 Facilitating sound client decision-making is
harder than it seems. It requires lawyers to suspend their professional tendency to "issuespot" their clients by honing in on the legally relevant facts and constructing their clients'
objectives in terms of legal claims and remedies. The professionalized construction of
clients as walking bundles of legal interests emphasizes what clients are entitled to get
from the law and de-emphasizes concerns that carry normative content, such as the
client's values, the client's reputation and standing in the community, and the preservation
of the client's relationships with others. It takes studied effort to look carefully and listen
5

Abraham S. Blumberg, The Practice of Law as a Confidence Game: Organizational
Cooptation of a Profession, 1 L. & SOC'Y REV. 15 (1966).
6
AUSTIN SARAT & WILLIAM L. F. FELSTINER, DIVORCE LAWYERS AND THEIR CLIENTS:
POWER AND MEANING IN THE LEGAL PROCESS (1995).
7
Donald C. Langevoort & Robert K. Rasmussen, Skewing the Results: The Role of
Lawyers in Transmitting Legal Rules, 5 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L. J. 375 (1997).
8
I have developed the ideas in the following two paragraphs more fully in two articles.
Katherine R. Kruse, Beyond Cardboard Clients in Legal Ethics, 23 GEO. J. LEGAL
ETHICS 103 (2010); Katherine R. Kruse, Fortress in the Sand: The Plural Values of
Client-Centered Representation, 12 CLIN. L. REV. 369 (2006).
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attentively for the larger context of a client's situation. It is much easier to fish for the
facts that will help define a client's objectives based on pre-existing legal categories. But
the legal aspects of a client's situation are only one facet of a larger and more complex
situation in which legal interests and entitlements interact with financial, reputational,
political, moral and other non-legal concerns. Lawyers are experts on the law; but clients
are the experts on their own lives.
Facilitating clients' sound moral judgment, however, does not mean that lawyers
should take a "hands-off" approach as legal technicians simply implementing their
clients' stated objectives. People don't seek legal advice from lawyers on most matters,
nor do they pursue legal intervention to resolve most disputes. When clients come
through the door, they are often in the grip of anger, fear, disappointment or betrayal, any
of which can affect sound moral decision-making just as they affect prudent selfinterested judgment. Given the complexity of moral decision-making, it is appropriate
for lawyers to question their clients' stated objectives and to treat those objectives as
subject to change with the passage of time. The underlying value of client autonomy
need not be equated with getting a client what the client says he or she wants in the
moment. It is fully consistent with helping clients make the best use of the formality and
finality of legal structures to resolve a situation or dispute in a way that suits the client's
long-term interests, preserves the client's important relationships, and honors the client's
values.
With respect to the morality of law, lawyers do have the expertise and are better
situated than their clients to understand and invoke the purposes of law as a constraint on
the pursuit of their clients' objectives. The jurisprudential bane of legal ethics is the legal
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realist conception of law as indeterminate, manipulable and nothing more than the
prediction of official behavior, which has been identified as the implicit operating
jurisprudence of practicing lawyers. The realist conception of law is seen as an invitation
to lawyers to "game" the law in pursuit of their clients' selfish interests. (Or, if you take
the more cynical view of the legal profession, as an opportunity for lawyers to further
their own interests at the expense of clients and the public).
Legal realism also provides the conceptualization of lawyers as lawmakers by
positing that the “law in action” includes the behavior of lower-level legal officials who
apply and enforce law. The lawmaking role of lawyers in advising and counseling their
clients "in the shadow of the law" forms a theoretical basis for establishing lawyers'
jurisprudential duties to interpret the law responsibly. I take the conceptualization of
lawyers as lawmakers to be an important plank in the theoretical platform on which
jurisprudential theories of legal ethics are built: in this category I would put Simon's view
that lawyers have a jurisprudential duty to interpret law according to its internal
principles of justice; and Wendel's view that lawyers have a duty of fidelity to positive
law as society's resolution of contested moral issues. (If I am wrong about this, I invite
them to clarify or correct me).
Although my own views on the jurisprudence of legal ethics are not yet fully
formed, I question the conceptualization of lawyers as lawmakers in the shadow of the
law. This conceptualization creates a lawyer-centered mechanism for determining the
legitimacy of law, in which lawyers judge and screen interpretations of law that meet or
do not meet operative criteria of legitimacy. While information about law's purposes and
enforcement are matters of legal expertise, assessments of law's legitimacy--whether to
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respect the law or how much respect to accord the law--are lay judgments that more
properly belong with clients. I view the "shadow of the law" as a testing ground where
the dictates of positive law interact with social norms and earn legitimacy. Legitimacy is
earned as people come to respect law as authoritative; it is not earned to the extent that
people reject law as nothing more than power backed by sanctions and seek to avoid its
reach. Lawyers have a jurisprudential duty to situate their clients to make appropriately
informed assessments about the legitimacy of law by explaining law's scope and
enforcement within the context of a sympathetic account of law's underlying purposes.

12

I. Not Morality at All, and Certainly Not Morality as Regulative Ideal
Daniel Markovits
Philosophical legal ethics should abandon what most have taken to be its central
task – the effort to develop moral principles capable of guiding and indeed of regulating
lawyers’ professional lives. Philosophers who engage the practice of law should instead
seek to reconstruct the contribution that this practice makes to the political authority of
retail dispute resolution.
To begin with, the quest for a regulative moral ideal that might guide lawyers’
professional conduct is not philosophically very interesting. Lawyering is not in the end
a distinctive moral practice. Rather, it is simply one case among many of moral conduct
in the shadow of partial and hence potentially agent-relative reasons. This broader class
of cases spans from promise at the thin end (promisors acquire obligations to perform
even when it is not best overall that they do so) to the affective relations associated with
love at the other. A lawyer’s obligations to her client fall somewhere in between, in a
space that they share, roughly, with the obligations of agents and fiduciaries more
generally. There are philosophical things worth saying about all of these cases, but they
have mostly already been said. And whatever they are, they apply to lawyers, who are
not special in respect of their partiality, in the usual way. I take this to be as true of my
previous efforts to discuss lawyerly partiality as of anyone else’s. Although I perhaps
wrote as if lawyers are special, they are not. Everything that I said (at least everything
true that I said) applies with very little modification to other agents. Once again, there is
nothing to see here; legal ethics should move on.
Legal ethics should avoid the quest to govern lawyers’ professional conduct
through regulative moral ideals for another reason also. Philosophical ethics is quite
generally not well-suited to producing regulative guides to moral life.
This is, to be sure, decidedly the minority view. Ever since Plato’s peculiar
introduction of ethics in The Republic – through reporting Socrates’s question “How
should one live?” and then recounting a series of efforts to go about answering it – the
dominant tradition of moral philosophy has taken the subject to possess a recursive
structure. Rational reflection about the good life, Socrates’s question suggests, might be
expected to produce regulative principles for living – rules for how one should live –
which might themselves be rationally applied and pursued.
Moral philosophy is thus brought, simply in virtue of the question from which it
begins, into a very close connection with its subject, that is, with morality itself. Given
the question that he takes as his starting point, it is natural – necessary, really – for
Socrates also to say, as he famously did, that the unexamined life is not worth living.
Moreover, it is natural and necessary that he means by this that the living and the
examining – reflection and self-reflection – should employ the same, rational, faculty.
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The good man, after all, is one in whom the rational part of his tri-partite soul dominates
the other two.
There is, however, no reason to think, as a general and purely formal matter, that
normative ethics must have this recursive structure. To the contrary, there are good
reasons to think that it need, and perhaps even should, not do. Perhaps most
immediately, normative ethicists are conspicuously not better people than others, and
legal ethicists are conspicuously not more ethical lawyers. This is probably most often
explained, among philosophers, by observing that although philosophical understanding
does indeed render a person better able accurately to discern principles for living well, it
does not enable her better to live by the principles that she adopts. This, philosophers
say, is because moral philosophy does not decrease immoral appetites or increase selfcontrol.
That is plainly not a good explanation. For one thing, if moral philosophy really
could produce even this narrowly cabined moral improvement, then moral philosophy
surely would help the moral philosophers who pursue it be on balance more moral than
others. They would not, to be sure, require less self-control or possess more; but they
would deploy whatever self-control they do possess in directions that more accurately
track flourishing. And, relatedly, it would render moral philosophers useful to others
interested in how they should live, because philosophers might help guide others
concerning the regulative principles that they should adopt for themselves, even if they
do not always manage to live by them and even if philosophers cannot close the gap
between ambition and achievement. In fact, however, moral philosophers are not better
than other people even in this weak and narrow way; rather they are no better than others.
Moreover, it is highly doubtful that moral philosophers actually do enjoy even the
narrowly cabined, and practically impotent, advantage in living well that they sometimes
claim. Non-philosophers notoriously do not seek philosophical advice for living, in an
effort to leverage philosophers’ theoretical understanding in their own efforts to live well.
Applied ethics is a vanishingly small and un-influential field compared to economics,
psychology, management studies, religion, and even self-help. And where applied
ethicists do gain influence, they tend to stray from their philosophical activities, which is
why applied ethics is held in relatively low esteem within the philosophy profession.
Indeed, common opinion probably holds that ethics is an area in which reflection on
balance destroys knowledge, or at least in which those who reflect too much, at least
about regulative principles, cannot be good naturally.
Another class of reasons against the necessity of beginning from Socrates’s
question arises from the fact that other areas of philosophy – including areas located near
normative ethics – reject that question’s recursiveness. Meta-ethics is one example: any
number of meta-ethical views ascribe a rational status to their own propositions that they
deny to the ethical propositions whose nature they study. Moreover, another field of
practical philosophy, aesthetics, expressly abandons recursiveness even in its normative
mode. Even aestheticians who take themselves to be elaborating normative principles
that explain what beauty is (rather than just meta-aesthetic ideas concerning the nature of
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claims about beauty), do not take themselves to be explaining how to produce beauty.
Indeed, an essential part of being a self-respecting aesthetician nowadays is to deny that
one is developing regulative principles for making art. And ethicists, their express
methodological commitments to the contrary notwithstanding, implicitly make a similar
concession. Moral philosophy, after all, is identified in distinction to philosophy of mind,
say, or metaphysics, and not to immoral philosophy.
Happily, Socrates’s question is not, in fact, the only properly philosophical
question that one might ask about ethics. Rather than asking how one should live, one
might ask: “what is a good life like?” This question is clearly amenable to the methods
of philosophy. It is, after all, no different formally from any number of other plainly
philosophical questions, ranging from metaphysics (“what is substance like?”) to
philosophy of mind (“what is intention like?”) to philosophy of language (“what is
reference like?”). And in this formulation, the basic question of ethics leaves open
whether or not understanding philosophical answers to it will help a person living the life
that they describe.
All of these ideas might naturally be applied specifically to legal ethics. On this
approach, the basic question for philosophical legal ethics is not how should lawyers
regulate their professional practices? Rather the basic question for philosophical legal
ethics asks what kind of a practice lawyering is? What are lawyering’s immanent norms
and how are these related to other moral ideals? How does lawyering fit into modern
ethical life more generally? None of these questions calls for philosophical derivations of
regulative ideals. All are morally deep and important, and all are amenable to
philosophical analysis. Virtually no philosophical legal ethics takes up these questions,
however. And the core methods and concerns of the field should therefore change.
This methodological reorientation will naturally produce a substantive
reorientation for legal ethics also. The reason is that even the briefest engagement with
the immanent structure of the law governing lawyers reveals that this body of law is not
so much a moral as a political construction. (This should not be surprising, as a positive
moral law is virtually impossible, whereas positive law is the first and central
achievement of politics.) That is, the law governing lawyers is not so much concerned
with the nature or content of an individual life well-lived as with how to sustain solidarity
in the face of entrenched and intractable disagreement about the good life.
The positive law reflects an integrative achievement. When various factions
(interested and moral) come together to adopt a particular piece of positive law, and to
affirm its authority, they fix which resolution of their disagreements the will obey even in
the face of ongoing disagreement about which resolution it would have been best for
them to adopt. (This achievement, incidentally, is qualitatively the same wherever the
authority of positive law is jointly acknowledged by competing factions. It does not
depend nearly so much on the democratic character of positive law as most contemporary
commentators presume.)
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It is less often noticed that the resolution of individual disputes, at retail, has a
similar structure. When individual disputants accept the authority of a particular
adjudication, they similarly fix which resolution to their dispute they will obey in the face
of their ongoing disagreement about which to adopt. The legal order that establishes
processes of individual dispute resolution concerning the application of substantive law
thus displays an immanent authority that runs in parallel to the authority of the
mechanisms of wholesale dispute resolution that govern the enactment of substantive
law. The law governing lawyers belongs to centrally to the practices of retail-disputeresolution. A legal ethics that seeks to discern the immanent norms of the practice of law
will therefore ask, insistently, what lawyering contributes to the authority of retail dispute
resolution and how the law governing lawyers supports this contribution.
This should be the central question for philosophical legal ethics. It has, however,
been virtually totally ignored. Talcott Parsons took up the question sociologically a halfcentury or so ago, and the law and society movement has looked in on Parsons’s insights
every now and then. Lon Fuller’s work on adjudication has mined a similar vein but has
also been largely ignored. More recently, I have tried to organize and provide a
philosophical foundation for their insights for the special case of the adversary trial.
None of these efforts (and especially not mine) has had much to say about how lawyers
contribute to retail dispute resolution outside of trials, including in particular through
contractual negotiations (including, but not limited to, through settlement contracts).
Almost forty years after Fried asked the question from which our discussion takes
its theme, therefore, the most important features of legal ethics remain almost totally
mysterious.
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Locating Morality in Legal Practice: Lawyer? Client? The Law?
Stephen Pepper

University of Denver
Sturm College of Law

When practicing lawyers, law professors, and scholars in our field speak of “legal
ethics” they almost always are thinking about the ethics of the practice of law, the ethics
involved in accomplishing legal work for clients. For that reason I think it more precise
and helpful to refer to our field of inquiry as “lawyers’ ethics,” and thus to phrase our
question as: “Is the concern of lawyers’ ethics the morality of lawyers, the morality of
clients, or the morality of laws?” I would guess that we all think that the answer is “all
three,” and as I have rephrased it, I would say “all three” with a possibly decreasing
degree of directness.
Morality of Lawyers (1)
“Can a good lawyer be a good person?” What are the
foundations from which we determine and structure our understanding of right and wrong
in regard to the professional conduct of lawyers? Law is intended to be a public resource,
available to all. That means we all have something like an entitlement to know and use
the law that limits, channels and empowers us. The basic function of lawyers, of the
legal profession, is to provide access to law for those who can’t access it without
assistance. We presume that law is created and intended to have a positive effect
(although this is a controvertible claim, appropriate for the third aspect of our question),
and that it is intended to be available to all. By providing access to this “good,” lawyers
in the aggregate perform a morally justifiable (and arguably admirable) function. This
functional foundation for the ethics (and consequent morality) of lawyers is structural,
institutional and general.
But what about the retail level? Lawmakers create law intended to have a positive
effect. But what they create is general, usually relatively rough, often rules of thumb.
Even if we are willing to presume that in the aggregate law has a good or positive effect,
we know that often in the specific it does not. Law (particularly facilitative law such as
contract or corporate) is often a neutral tool; it can be used to good or bad effect. (The
exclusionary rule, to take an example from a quite different field, shields the guilty along
with the innocent.) At the level of the specific usage of the law by the client enabled by
the lawyer, can we still conclude that the lawyer’s function is morally justifiable? Should
we create an ethical structure for lawyers in which law is not generally available, in
which each lawyer in each instance functions as a lawmaker to determine whether or not
the specific use of the law is allowable or not? Or is how and whether to use the law a
choice to be made by each of us, perhaps with the assistance, guidance and advice of a
(preferably ethical) lawyer? (See “Lawyer 2” below.) Are lawyers primarily in service
to clients, facilitating access to law? Or are they primarily delegated agents of the state,
making law on a situation by situation basis? The values of equal access to law and of
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the autonomy of each individual suggest that each lawyer ought not make law for each
situation. In addition, clients, particularly individual clients, are often dependent and
vulnerable in relation to their lawyers, and the lawyers are in a position to be tempted to
exploit that vulnerability by making choices that serve the lawyer’s interests rather than
the client’s. (There are also practical problems with the alternative. Consider for a
moment the lawyer as arbiter model. Would we not have some entrepreneurial law
student develop a site to match sophisticated clients with morally, policy or politically
like-minded lawyers to avoid the problem of moral screening of otherwise lawful
conduct? Would powerful, sophisticated corporations even need such a web site to locate
lawyers likely to approve usages of the law facilitative to their purposes and goals?) On
the level of the particular instance, providing “neutral” access to law is thus morally
justifiable and arguably admirable, although often more problematic than at the remove
of the general, structural and institutional. I have made this argument more elaborately
before (“The Lawyer’s Amoral Ethical Role”), and, as might be expected, I disagree with
the opening premise of our topic that the criticisms of this understanding and role are
“seemingly devastating.”9
Imagine for a moment the well-known example of a debtor who admits to his
lawyer that he owes a substantial amount of money. The client debtor is significantly
better off financially than the creditor and the debt is currently due and unpaid. This is a
“just” debt, with no obvious reason or justification for not repaying. The lawyer’s
consideration of the surrounding facts reveals that there is a statute of limitations or
statute of frauds defense under the facts that will prevent court enforcement of the debt—
it is a just and admitted debt, but unenforceable under the law. There is a general moral
consensus in our society that, all other things being equal, one should pay one’s just
debts. If one has borrowed and used someone else’s money under promise of repayment,
one ought as a matter of common morality to repay. Should the lawyer enforce this
consensus moral understanding on the client, and refuse to plead the technical defense if
the matter goes to litigation? Should the lawyer, perhaps, not even inform the client of
the existence of the valid defense? The lawmakers (legislative and judicial) have chosen
a bright line rule, knowing it will sometimes result in injustice. Should our regime of
lawyers’ ethics change that bright line to an “under all the circumstances” moral decision
by the particular lawyer? (Similarly, should the choice of whether or not to invoke the
exclusionary rule in a criminal proceeding be an all things considered, under these
particular circumstances, moral decision by the lawyer?) I have suggested above that:
(a) law as a public good, (b) equal access to that public good, (c) the autonomy of
individuals, (d) the vulnerability of clients to their lawyers, and (d) the natural tendency
9

. Consider Pepper, A Rejoinder to Professors Kaufman and Luban, 1986 American Bar
Foundation Research Journal 657, 662-673, and whether the critique, or the critique of
the critique, is more persuasive.
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of lawyers to take advantage (intentionally or inadvertently) of their client’s vulnerability,
all suggest that these decisions should be for the client, not for the lawyer.
Morality of Lawyers (2)
Thus the general role (the structural or institutional role) of
the lawyer’s function is directly concerned with the morality of lawyers. There is a
second dimension on which lawyers’ ethics (aka “legal ethics”) can be (and I would
suggest ought to be) quite directly concerned with the morality of lawyers. When the
client’s access to or use of the law is morally problematic, the lawyer ought to counsel
with the client concerning that problem. If the lawyer has concluded that the client’s use
of the law may be morally wrongful, that ought to be made clear to the client. The
lawyer can counsel the client that it will be the client, and not the lawyer or the law, who
will be primarily responsible for a morally wrongful but lawful use of the law.10 In the
just debt/technical defense situation, for example, the lawyer might ask why it is that the
client is considering resisting paying an admitted debt, or is seeking advice about that
possibility. Or she might find some other gentle, respectful way to initiate moral
deliberation with the client about the debt and its repayment. The lawyer would explore
with the client the fairness, justice, and morality aspects of the situation and options.
Depending on the client’s response to the “why” question, she might ask whether the
client thinks it is “right” or “fair” for the creditor not to be repaid the money he gave to
the client and that the client has used. These are difficult conversations to contemplate,
but with skill and sensitivity perhaps not so difficult to accomplish. The lawyer can assist
the client to draw out and clarify his values. The lawyer can respectfully influence client
choice and conduct without manipulating or dominating it. The interchange can, and
should, run both ways. It is quite possible the client will persuade the lawyer that what
she first thought was morally wrongful is in fact justifiable. (Instruction in legal writing
for law students is required for accreditation of law schools, and instruction in written
and oral advocacy is usually included for first year students. Instruction in the arguably
more basic and fundamental lawyering skill of counseling is, unfortunately, not required
and commonly not provided.)
Lawyers too often repress their moral perception and intuition. To the extent they
choose to engage in this aspect of the ethics of lawyering, they can exercise, develop and
refine their moral perception, intuition, reasoning and counsel. To the extent lawyers, to
the contrary, repress this aspect of their understanding and do not develop these skills,
they contribute to the moral coarsening of our common culture. The unstated or
background message between lawyer and client can be quite influential in this regard.
10

. “It ought to be part of the lawyer’s ethical obligation to clarify that merely because
one has a legal right to do x, doing x is not necessarily the right thing to do. The lawyer
ought to ensure that the client is aware that x, though lawful and otherwise advantageous
to the client, may well be morally unjustifiable.” Pepper, Lawyers Ethics in the Gap
Between Law and Justice, 40 South Texas L. Rev. 181, 190-91 (1999).
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Imagine two different lawyers’ reactions to the client’s hesitation at repaying the “just
debt.” One lawyer, taking the “bad man” or “hardball” approach to law and human
relations, suggests, either implicitly or explicitly, that if the law does not require
repayment, only a “sap” would part with money he doesn’t have to. Another lawyer,
more along the lines I’ve suggested in the paragraph above, wonders whether it is “right”
or “fair” for the creditor to not be repaid the money owed, even if the law will not require
it. Will the difference in attitude of these two lawyers on occasion influence the attitude,
and consequent choices, of the client? Which of these two lawyers would you prefer as
your legal counsel?
Morality of Clients
With this possibility of respectfully influencing the choices and conduct of the
client through lawyer-client deliberation and moral counsel, we connect to the second
topic of our question and have a bridge joining the morality of clients with the morality of
the practice of law. Years ago I wrote that “[m]orality comes through the door with the
client.” The lawyer can attempt to bring out and develop that morality, and can also
bring her own moral perception and understanding of the situation. Tom Shaffer thinks
lawyers should be less concerned with client autonomy and more concerned with client
goodness. I think lawyers should be concerned with both. Autonomy trumps—it is the
client’s life and law is a publicly available resource that frequently requires the assistance
of a lawyer—but there is a large potential role for moral influence. With both our
students and practicing lawyers this is a dimension of law practice we should teach,
encourage and try to model. (Client autonomy trumps, that is, unless the lawyer decides
she is unwilling to assist the particular client conduct at issue. Issues relating to when
and whether withdrawal from the matter, or from assisting the client altogether, is
ethically appropriate are beyond the range of this brief response.)
The corporation as a client is particularly problematic in this regard. What is the
morality coming through the door with the corporate client? What is it that the lawyer is
drawing out? Here we have the risk of amoral ethics squared. The corporate executive’s
defined institutional role is to maximize shareholder value or profit; the lawyer’s is to
provide access to the law; each has a defined role morality that arguably subordinates, or
is at least significantly different from, ordinary morality. Neither “amoral” role needs to
be exclusive, however. Corporate management can choose to repay the just debt, and it
will not be considered a waste of corporate assets despite the available legal defense. The
lawyer can remind the client of values that may be implicated in addition to the usually
presumed ones of maximizing either material welfare or freedom. It may not be the
defined professional role of either to figure out what is the morally right thing to do, all
things considered, but being concerned with that question is not outside or contrary to
either role. In fact, deliberation concerning the “all things considered” ordinary morality
question is likely to enhance both roles. It would leaven business/legal decisions with a
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moral dimension too often minimized or repressed, and would certainly improve the
moral aspect of the professional lives of both lawyers and executives.
Morality of Law
As enacted a legal provision is a generality, often a rule of thumb,
intended in the aggregate to serve particular policy and moral purposes. (And, as Brad
Wendel has emphasized, these purposes are often compromises of contending values and
moral understandings.) The lawyer, however, is present at a specific potential application
of that legal provision. At that point application of the law may or may not serve those
moral or policy purposes and values, the compromise intention may have little or no
connection to the specific facts, or the legally directed or facilitated result may be
perverse in relation to generally accepted values or the particular values underlying the
legal provision. A statute of frauds or limitations embodies an awkward policy and value
compromise. It contemplates and tolerates just debts being extinguished, but it does not
seem quite accurate to say that is its purpose. A legal provision’s moral/policy
compromise is up in the air and abstract; lawyer and client are down on the ground where
the law’s effect will be concrete and specific. At that point—where it’s not abstract—
lawyer and client can measure and evaluate all the actual circumstances and potential
effects involved in whether or not and how to use the law. Lawyer and client can discuss
and consider all this and reach a decision reflecting the client’s values and interests (as
partly refined and developed by that conversation). These values and interests should at
least take into consideration those embodied in the legal provision, but they are unlikely
to be the only ones implicated in the decision, and certainly not always the most
important. The lawyer can inform the client of the purposes of the statute of frauds, and
how those purposes are inapposite to the circumstances of the admitted just debt. One
can imagine the multiple factors that might be relevant to a corporation’s decision as to
whether or not to assert the defense in a particular situation, including the nature of the
client and the creditor, their relationship, and management’s view of the values and value
compromises instantiated in the applicable legal provisions and the overall situation.
I’m inclined to think that the “morality of the law” is best incorporated in the
practice of law through day-to-day counseling, education and deliberation between
lawyer and client (and I envision that process as very much a two-way conversation).
The lawyer should, when practicable, provide the client with a full spectrum view of the
law: 1) the straight, neutral or objective application of the law to the situation (the on the
surface, most obvious, or most likely intended or understood meaning); 2) the more
capacious alternative understandings or applications of the law as it could be interpreted,
argued or manipulated (by both “sides” if this is a contested or negotiated matter); and 3)
the purposes of the law or the values and policies it is designed to serve. This counseling
may well be part of or inextricable from the broader moral conversation described above
in the “Morality of Lawyer 2” section. Through this process the morality of the law can
interact with the morality of the client and that of the lawyer.
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Conclusion All of this assumes a greater degree of moral consensus than many of you
may believe exists. Here, I think, we tend to exaggerate fundamental differences. For
most questions that arise in day-to-day legal practice I would guess there is a fair amount
of agreement on the morally right conduct. In the just debt example, all other things
being equal, most agree that one ought to repay what one has borrowed on the promise of
repayment. (The recent ferment over strategic mortgage default arises from the unease of
not repaying balanced against factors that suggest all other things aren’t equal: the
expectation of the parties may not have included further repayment beyond giving up the
home upon default, and there may be far less than clean hands on the part of the financial
institution holding the debt.) We tend to agree it is morally wrong to cause needless pain,
suffering, or harm; that it is better to be generous than selfish; better to be kind than
hurtful; and so on. Moral deliberation between lawyer and client is likely to draw more
attention to that agreement and to some extent actualize it. It is also a part of the ethics of
lawyering that can enable and enliven morality in lawyer, client and the law.
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ILEC Jurisprudence Panel
Bill Simon
LEGAL ETHICS SHULD BE PRIMARILY A MATTER OF PRINCIPLES, NOT
RULES
Is legal ethics most fundamentally a matter of differentiated professional morality
or of general ordinary morality?11 My direct answer would be “both”. It’s useful to
distinguish the two perspectives.

Different methods, sources of authority, and

jurisdictional norms apply to each. But the lawyer is both a role occupant and a general
moral agent and thus is subject to both types of norms, and I don’t think it is important to
give priority to either.
I want to give a longer indirect answer to the question by addressing a distinct but
overlapping issue – whether legal ethics practice norms should take the form of – in
Dworkin’s terminology – rules or principles. Here I think the question of priority is
important. My answer is: principles. I think the yearning for rules is pathological and
that much prominent theorizing about legal ethics errs by catering to it or at least by
failing to squarely repudiate it.
One way the issue of rules v. principles overlaps the issue of law v. morality is the
occasional tendency to think of law in terms of rules and morality in terms of principles.
But this tendency does not survive reflection. Law can be about principles (Dworkin);
morality can be about rules (Kant).
Legal ethics theory often begins by elaborating a master value and then deriving a
more specific set of practical norms from it (more often then not, something that looks a
lot like the ABA Model Rules). A key issue in this move is whether the specific norms
the master value generates are rules or principles. Does the master value give us a set of
more specific considerations that the practitioner is to weigh in the circumstances of the
11

The question, as posed, asks that we also consider whether it might also be about
the “client’s morality.” I think this is one option too many. Lawyers, of course, should
respect their clients’ values, but they should do so because of a morality grounded in law
or the lawyer’s own commitments. Until the client is constituted by these latter norms as
a role occupant entitled to special respect, she is – morally -- just a random stranger
seeking assistance.
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particular case? Or does it give us a set of rules that dictate conduct even in the face of
(what the lawyer strongly believes) are weightier competing considerations?
Consider Pepper, Wendel, and Markovits.
-- For Pepper the master values are access-to-law and liberty. According to
Pepper, they translate into norms of strong client loyalty. But what happens when client
loyalty does not serve any client interest that we could associate with liberty or access-tolaw and infringes the liberty or access-to-law interests of another person? Say the client
X has assaulted Y. Y has filed a claim that X privately concedes is valid, but Y has filed
mistakenly in the wrong jurisdiction. If the lawyer for X does not inform Y of her
mistake, the statute of limitations will expire and Y will have no remedy.
For Wendel, the master value is coordination. Coordination translates into values
of respect for law, Purposively understood, and a more limited client loyalty. But what
happens in situations where respect for law impedes coordination? (Such situations are
very common. What the French call the “strike of zeal” and what Bob Kagan and
Eugene Bardach call “going by the book” refer to the use of law enforcement to disrupt
social coordinaton.) For example, Kansas and some other states have laws that preclude
automobile sellers who do not have an in-state sales facility from delivering a new car to
a purchaser within the state. Everyone concedes that the statute is an act of naked rent
seeking on the part of Kansas dealers. Should a lawyer assist a client in evading (or
outright violating) this statute?

[I can think of reasons not to, including the possibility

of getting in trouble and deference to the democratic authority of the legislature, but the
reasons have nothing to do with coordination. Coordination cuts toward violation, at
least if we can do it secretly, so we don’t have to worry about a slippery slope.]
For Markovits, the master values are client/citizen self-assertion and political
legitimacy. For the lawyer, they translate into norms of strong client loyalty. But what
should the lawyer do when the client wants to take an aggressive position for reasons that
will reduce the legitimacy of the outcome (as the client herself and others perceive it)?
Say the client wants the lawyer to impeach a truthful witness in order to help establish a
claim she does not believe is valid. She thinks that the legal system is corrupt and
incompetent and her success will confirm that view.
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If I understand them, Pepper and Wendel seem committed to rule-type answers to
these questions. I’m not clear about Markovits. We could read him to say that “lying”
and “cheating” are only permissible on behalf of a position sincerely held by the client,
but if so, his ethic puts him more radically at odds with existing professional norms than
he acknowledges.
In all three cases, it would be possible to assert an interpretation of the master
value (liberty, coordination, legitimacy) that simply tracked the conduct required by the
more specific rules. (So liberty and political legitimacy means just whatever you can get
when your lawyer follows the Model Rules; coordination is just whatever happens when
people obey the law). Of course, this is circular reasoning. I don’t expect any of my
three friends to embrace it explicitly, but if they respond to my hypotheticals by trying to
show that there is no tension between the specific practices I mention and their master
values, then I will suspect them of tacitly moving toward this position.
The argument for rules seems to depend on an additional premise that mediates
between the master value and the specific norms/rules. This is the assumption that
lawyers are not good at contextual judgment. Lawyers may be prone to biases or may
lack information.

Or individual lawyers faced with comparable circumstances will

decide inconsistently, and hence, introduce inequity. Or lawyer decisions, even when
justifiable in isolation, may trigger cascades of unjustifiable behavior that would send us
down a slippery slope. Note that, to advance the case for rules, the argument has to assert
a systematic tendency on the part of individual lawyers to make bad judgments. There’s
no reason why an individual lawyer making a contextual judgment cant take into account
such matters as the limits of her and knowledge and capacities, the danger of a slippery
slope, and the danger of inconsistency. The claim on behalf of rules has to be that, in
general, lawyers will make such judgments badly.
I think there are three core problems with the argument for rules:
1. The claim about the unreliability of individual lawyer judgment must be a
comparative one. Individuals have limited information and competence with respect to
the circumstances and effects of individual judgments. Compared to what? Presumably
compared to the information and competence centralized rule-making institutions have
with respect to general circumstances and aggregates. Although this position seems
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clearly entailed by the rules position, I have yet to see anyone make a serious case for it.
Perhaps individual lawyers will often mis-estimate the effects of refusing to crossexamine a truthful witness, but do we really think that, collectively, their judgments will
be less reliable then a rule-making body trying to decide the aggregates effects of a rule
forbidding or requiring lawyers to do so?
2. If lawyers are bad at contextualized judgment, what are they good at?
Ambitious visions of professionalism have consistently portrayed contextualized
judgment as the core skill of the professional. As the ABA put it in EC 3-5, “The essence
of the professional judgment of the lawyer is his educated ability to relate the general
body and philosophy of law to a specific legal problem of a client.” No one would ever
think of defining the duty of care to clients in terms of Dworkinian rules. [Duties owed
nonclients, of course, are weaker than duties owed clients. But the issue is not the
strength of the duty, but the form it should take – rules v. standards. If lawyers’ duties to
clients are premised on a highly-developed capacity for complex judgment, I don’t see
how the design of duties to strangers could be premised on the lack such capacity.]
3. The arguments do not take account of the moral cost of rules in alienating the
lawyer from the values underlying the norms pertinent to her situation and hence from the
larger conception of law that gives meaning and dignity to her role. The most appealing
promise of professionalism is to reconcile individual creativity and public service,
personal ambition and social need. Rules, even if justified in some long-term aggregate
sense, betray this promise. A lawyer forced by a rule to cross-examine a truthful witness
is at best like Williams’s Jim, forced to shoot a hostage in order to save the lives of
others.
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The Morality of Lawyers or the Morality of Laws:
Making Sense of the Idea of an Institutional Legal Ethics
Brad Wendel
Social and professional roles really wouldn’t be much of a puzzle in ethics if they only
prescribed heightened duties. A person’s role as a parent, teacher, or public official
burdens that person with additional obligations, over and above those that attach to being
a moral agent generally. I have duties to take care of my children, for example, going well
beyond the positive duties I owe to further the welfare of people generally. Professional
ethics only becomes problematic when it posits exclusionary obligations or permissions –
that is, role-specific prescriptions that supersede or outweigh what would otherwise be
requirements of ordinary morality. The standard conception of legal ethics supposedly
requires a lawyer “to put to one side considerations of various sorts — and especially
various moral considerations — that would otherwise be relevant if not decisive.” 12 The
exclusionary character of the lawyer’s role creates genuine duties, but also leads to the
charge that lawyers are inhabiting a simplified moral universe without justification.
Talking about the exclusionary character of professional morality of course requires that
we get clear on the baseline of ordinary morality, which is purportedly excluded by duties
specific to the professional role. The modifier “ordinary”on morality is intended to
capture the idea of moral principles that apply to us simply as people, as moral agents
full-stop, not as occupants of social roles or institutions. Ordinary morality is to be
contrasted with the obligations that may arise for occupants of social roles. One way to
understand a role in normative terms is as a shorthand way of describing a cluster of
obligations, permissions, and aspirations that apply by virtue of standing in a particular
kind of relationship with others – what I call the nexus view. 13 A role, and associated
role-specific obligations (which may be in the form of rules), are all merely summaries of
obligations that exist apart from the role. The obligations of the role are accordingly
transparent to moral analysis. The reasons lawyers give to justify their actions are
translated into ordinary moral reasons, and analyzed as such.
Some social roles, however, appear to involve not a nexus of ordinary moral reasons, but
specific obligations that are different in kind from, and potentially conflict with, what
would otherwise be the moral requirements that would apply to someone differently
situated.14 These role-specific considerations all make a claim that other reasons should
12
13

Richard Wasserstrom, “Lawyers as Professionals: Some Moral Issues,” 5 Human Rights 1, 3 (1975).
See, e.g., Arthur Isak Applbaum, Ethics for Adversaries 46 (1999) ( “are roles merely shorthand for a

nexus of obligations, values, and goods that have moral weight without appeal to role as a moral category?”); David Luban, Lawyers
and Justice 125 (1988) (“the appeal to a role in moral justification is simply a shorthand method of appealing to the moral reasons
incorporated in that role”).
14
See, e.g., Tim Dare, The Counsel of Rogues?: A Defense of the Standard Conception of the Lawyer’s Role 34 (2009) (“Roleobligations . . . are moral requirements whose content is fixed by the function of the role, whose normative force flows from the role,
and that apply to an individual by virtue of their status as a role- occupant.”).
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not have priority in the analysis of the rightness or wrongness of the lawyer’s actions.
They either exclude otherwise applicable moral reasons, or at least are thought to
outweigh them in most cases. Whatever metaphor one uses — exclusion, trumping,
outweighing, etc. — the idea is that reasons associated with a role are reasons not to act
on other reasons, those that would apply to a similarly situated agent not acting in that
role. They are what Raz would call second-order reasons, that is, reasons not to act on
reasons.15
Roles and the duties associated with them take shape within larger practices, and these
practices must be justified on the basis of some moral good that the practices achieve.
The question then arises why this is not simply the “nexus” view previously described,
which holds that the concept of role is merely a shorthand way of referring to otherwise
existing moral obligations, as they are specified in a particular social context. The
problem with the nexus view, as applied to legal ethics, is that it may be insufficiently
sensitive to the institutional or political context in which lawyers practice. One way of
understanding the “ordinariness” of ordinary morality is that it is fundamentally noninstitutional in character. When we say that people ought to honor values such as dignity
and truth in their relations with one another, we imagine that these relations are
unmediated by structures of government, either state government or something less
informal, belonging to the institutions of civil society. When the interests of people come
into conflict, morality provides resources for figuring out whose interests should take
precedence, but the setting one generally presupposes is some kind of small-scale
interaction, which one imagines might be resolved through reasoning and dialogue. In the
case of larger-scale disagreement, institutions provide ways of handling conflict in a way
that does not depend directly on the ordinary moral values at stake. Legal institutions in
particular have virtues that are related to impartiality, the fairness of the procedures they
provide for dealing with conflict, and their capacity to treat people with equal dignity and
respect. As soon as relations among persons are governed by something more formal, it
is natural to look to the properties of those institutions as a source of values and reasons.
One of the central questions in theoretical legal ethics is whether the toolkit of moral
concepts that should be brought to bear on the analysis is the same toolkit that is used
elsewhere in moral philosophy, or whether it is tied to professional roles, institutions, or
values in a distinctive way. I have argued that legal ethics is part of a freestanding
political morality, which gains its structure and obligatory force from the situation of
compliance with morality in communities.16 This does not mean that these values are
unrelated to ordinary morality, only that they may not be reducible in a straightforward
way to ordinary moral considerations. The relationship, rather, is indirect, with ordinary
moral values going into the justification of a set of institutions, practices, and associated
normative ideals. For example, the political-moral notion of an individual as a citizen
15
16
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implies reciprocity and rough equality in the way one is treated by state actors and
institutions. The political theory of John Rawls begins with this kind of distinctive
political idea: “The philosophical conception of the person,” Rawls writes, “is replaced
in political liberalism by the political conception of citizens as free and equal.”17 Similarly,
legality, or the rule of law, suggests a number of evaluative criteria, including impartiality
and the commitment by the government to be bound by generally applicable rules. There
is an irreducible aspect of public-ness to this way of understanding the rule of law. Thus,
it is not clear that it can be translated into ordinary moral terms without significant
distortion, even though all of the animating ideas — justice, equality, reason-giving, and
so on — are cognizable within ordinary morality.
A case described by David Luban provides an excellent illustration of the difference
between an ordinary morality-based approach to legal ethics and one that focuses more on
the moral properties of institutions. The case involves a prosecutor in the Manhattan
District Attorney’s office who allegedly threw a case in favor of the defense, because he
was personally convinced of the innocence of the accused.18 The prosecutor, Daniel
Bibb, had been asked to conduct an internal investigation of a murder prosecution, and
after a two-year review, concluded that two men in prison were innocent. Defense
lawyers representing the two men had obtained a court hearing into the possibility that
newly discovered evidence would show their innocence. Bibb urged his supervisors to ask
the court to set aside the convictions, but the supervisors ordered him to go to the hearing
and present the strongest case for the government. Rather than following this instruction,
Bibb helped the defense lawyers sort through the new evidence, persuaded reluctant
witnesses to testify who could offer testimony helpful to the defendants, told the
witnesses what questions to expect at the hearing, and refused to attempt to undermine
the credibility of the witnesses on cross-examination. Commenting on the case, Stephen
Gillers said Bibb should be disciplined for subverting the government’s case. Luban
responded that Bibb deserved a medal, not a reprimand.
The debate between Gillers and Luban can be understood as turning on the weight a
lawyer should give to ordinary moral considerations when serving in a representative
capacity. As Gillers put it, Bibb may be entitled to his conscience, but his conscience
permits only withdrawal from the case, not throwing for the defense. Luban, by contrast,
believes that the role of a prosecutor incorporates a significant component of ordinary
moral decision-making. The role of a prosecutor is to seek justice, not to win at all costs.
Luban concedes that the positive law governing prosecutors specifies that the “seek
justice” maxim should be understood in certain narrow ways, including an obligation not
to pursue a prosecution without probable cause, and duties to turn over potentially
exculpatory or mitigating evidence. Still, he argues for a substantive ethical conception of
the prosecutor’s role in which seeking justice means more than merely complying with
17
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requirements stated in disciplinary rules and constitutional law. At a minimum, seeking
justice means “you shouldn’t try to keep people behind bars if you think they didn’t do
it.” Fidelity to law cannot possibly mean actively seeking to keep someone in jail if a
lawyer has a sincere, well founded belief that he is innocent.
The weakness in Luban’s argument is that it overlooks the institutional context of Bibb’s
decision. The whole point of institutional decision-making processes is that one person’s
sincere belief about something is only an input into the process. Bibb’s certainty of the
innocence of the two defendants is not conclusive of what ought to be done with their
cases. A conclusive decision comes only after each actor in the system does its job,
presenting what necessarily is a one-sided, partisan view of the evidence. The relevant
process here is not just the adversary system, in which opposing evidence is presented
by defense counsel (who may have secured the reversal of the convictions anyway,
without Bibb’s assistance), but also includes intra-office review procedures and the chain
of command that necessarily facilitates decision-making in large organizations.
Significantly, Bibb’s supervisors disagreed with him, concluding that there was good
reason to believe the two men were guilty. Why should we trust Bibb’s belief more than
the belief of his supervisors? Presumably they made their decision upon consideration of
all of the evidence developed by Bibb in the internal investigation. Bibb can be made to
seem like a hero in this case only by stipulating that he made the right analysis of the
innocence of the defendants, but that simply begs the question, because the office
hierarchy and the internal investigation process are set up for the purpose of reaching
conclusions about whether there is enough evidence of guilt or innocence to justify going
to trial.
More generally, the valorization of lawyers like Bibb, who act on the basis of their own
beliefs about what justice requires, reflects a pervasive distrust of institutions by legal
ethics scholars. There is a tendency to presume that if an institutional process has
reached one conclusion (e.g. “sufficient evidence of guilt”) and an individual actor has
reached the contrary conclusion, the individual must be right. No one can deny that
institutions can reach unjust results, and can pressure or socialize individuals into doing
wrong. The Milgram experiments, Stanford Prison Experiment, and other findings of
social psychology demonstrate that people in groups respond to subtle behavioral cues,
and unconsciously rationalize away ethical qualms, all in the service of some collective
end which may be appalling (such as administering life-threatening electrical shocks). The
response to this observation, however, is not to rely more extensively on individual
ethical decision-making, because the whole point of these findings is that individual
judgment can be corrupted by situational factors. Instead of calling upon people to do
the right thing, either explicitly or implicitly by praising lawyers like Daniel Bibb, we
should seek more effective regulatory approaches to ensure that institutions do not
become corrupt. One may respond that, in the event of some regulatory failure,
individual decision makers may still be in a position to avoid injustice. Whether there
may be a better way to safeguard against wrongful convictions is one thing, but it is quite
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another to say that Bibb should not take personal moral responsibility for avoiding a
wrongful conviction if there has been some systemic failing.
Daniel Bibb’s defenders may respond that Bibb’s actions were based on his belief about
facts, not contested normative concepts like the public interest. Luban, for instance, has
long been a vigorous critic of the claim that the adversary system can be justified on its
utility at finding out factual truth.19 Adversarial litigation is often animated by a concern
to suppress relevant facts, not disclose them; a great deal of discovery practice in civil
litigation is aimed at ensuring that one’s adversary does not find out the whole truth.
Underfunded parties may lack the resources to conduct a thorough investigation, so not
only will they be ignorant of facts within their opponents’ knowledge, but they may also
be unaware of facts they might otherwise have been able to discover, given more time and
money. It is certainly not inconceivable that, in the course of a two-year internal
investigation, Bibb was able to learn previously unknown evidence suggesting the
innocence of the two defendants. On the basis of this evidence, Bibb believed his office
should do something to ensure the acquittal of the defendants.
The crucial elision in this argument comes between the word evidence and the inference to
conclusions about facts. Assuming Bibb acquired evidence, it still remains to be
determined, somehow, whether the defendants are factually guilty or innocent. Because
matters of the weight, sufficiency, and credibility of evidence are things about which
people can disagree, we have set up various institutional processes for dealing with this
disagreement. Adversarial litigation is one such process, but so are intra-office chains of
command and review procedures. Institutions such as law firms and prosecutors’ offices
are set up, in part, with a view toward making reliable decisions about what should be
done, in light of the evidence known to the lawyers in the organization. These decisions
are often made against a background of good faith disagreements about the right
conclusion to draw from the evidence. In this case, Bibb presented to his supervisors all
of the evidence he learned, and the supervisors concluded that there was sufficient reason
to continue to believe that the defendants were guilty. There must be some reason to
believe that Bibb is more likely to have weighed all of the relevant evidence correctly.
Bibb would not be “ducking his moral responsibility” if he had complied with the
procedures of his office. Rather, doing the morally responsible thing means respecting
the institutional scheme that is set up to accomplish some morally worthwhile end.
The Bibb example helpfully illustrates my overall argument, which is that a lawyer has a
very weighty moral reason to act with reference to client entitlements and work through
established procedures, rather than acting on the basis of ordinary moral notions like truth
and justice. This obligation of fidelity to law holds in reasonably just, well functioning
political systems, and depends on the capacity of the system to enable people to arrange
their relationships with each other with reference to rights established in the name of the
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community as a whole. Acting peremptorily, on one’s own beliefs about what justice
requires, or drawing one’s own conclusions about what the facts are that bear on a matter,
exhibits disrespect for the legal system and thus for one’s fellow citizens. The lawyer’s
duty is not absolute, and there may be circumstances in which an injustice is so patent,
and the result mandated by the regular functioning of the legal system so intolerable, that
no person could, in good conscience, believe that exhibiting fidelity to law is the right
thing to do, all things considered. There will, of course, be disagreement about which
cases fall into this category, but the important thing for the purposes of this argument is
to note that the obligation of fidelity to law is very weighty, and lawyers should regard as
exceptional any case of deviation from a result supported by client legal entitlements.
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The Legitimate Concerns of Legal Ethics
Alice Woolley
Faculty of Law, University of Calgary
“Pooh always liked a little something at eleven o'clock in the morning, and he was very glad to
see Rabbit getting out the plates and mugs; and when Rabbit said, "Honey or condensed milk
with your bread?" he was so excited that he said, "Both," and then, so as not to seem greedy, he
added, "But don't bother about the bread, please.””20

A recent article in the New York Times distinguished between the practice of
philosophy and the practice of law.21 It suggested that the concerns of philosophy are by
their very nature unconstrained by the dictates of time or by community conventions and
norms. The philosopher may be in the world, but he is not of the world. The lawyer, by
contrast, can escape neither time nor the facts and vagaries of the world; his task is to use
whatever skills he has to make the most of them.
Whatever the (in)accuracy of this exercise in stereotyping, lawyers who think
about philosophy, or philosophers who think about lawyers, have neither the posited
philosopher’s luxury of time, nor the posited lawyer’s ability to ignore broader or more
abstract implications of his daily work. Accomplishment of the exercise requires
bringing abstraction and thoughtfulness to bear on questions that are fundamentally
practical and of “this world.”
For the purposes of this session, which is intended to allow reflection on a set
question – Is the concern of legal ethics the morality of lawyers, the morality of clients,
or the morality of laws? – the significance of this observation is that it indicates, and
explains, the multi-faceted nature of legal ethics and, hence, the necessarily multi-faceted
concerns it must have. Whether, and in what way, legal ethics should be concerned with
the morality of lawyers, clients or laws, depends on why it has chosen to concern itself –
what practical question or inquiry is the exercise in more abstract or unconstrained
thinking to illuminate? Further, in “this world” most questions, most of the time, cannot
be satisfactorily resolved through a single analytical framework. Legal ethics does not
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have a concern, it has concerns and, much of the time, the morality of many things must
be considered for its concerns to be meaningfully illuminated.
Before I defend that position, I have a preliminary observation: legal ethics should
never be concerned with the morality of lawyers or of clients, but only with the morality
of the acts lawyers or clients take (or propose to take). Or, to put it slightly differently,
to the extent that legal ethics focuses on lawyers or clients, the concern must be with
what lawyers and clients do, not with who they are. This is for several reasons that I have
set out in more detail elsewhere and will only allude to here. First, to the extent moral
character exists it is not easily identified.22 Single or even several instances of behaviour
do not necessarily indicate whether a person has the virtue (or vice) associated with that
behaviour. Thus, saying we only want lawyers to represent clients with honest
characters would not give much indication to lawyers as to which clients they should
represent. Second, even if moral character does exist, it correlates poorly with conduct
across circumstances; requiring that lawyers have honest characters would not ensure
honest actions in the various circumstances of legal practice. Third, with perhaps an
exception or two, the majority of the practical questions with which legal ethics concerns
itself – such as what should a lawyer do? – focus squarely on acts of the lawyer or client.
Given that, to the extent morality is relevant, it is the morality of the act, not of the actor,
that matters.
That observation merely reframes the question, of course. It does not change my
answer, which is, first, that whether, and in what way, legal ethics should be concerned
with the morality of laws, or of the acts of lawyers or clients, depends on why it has
concerned itself; and, second, that, much of time, the morality of all of those things must
be considered, to answer a question in a satisfactory way.
Consider this example. In Alberta, the Code of Conduct states that when a client
discloses the intention to commit suicide, the lawyer must treat that disclosure as
confidential unless either the lawyer has some reason, other than the suicide intention
itself, to question the client’s mental capacity, or some other exception to confidentiality
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applies, such as client consent. For a legal ethicist, this provision, and the scenario it
addresses, raises a number of questions. If faced with a suicidal client, what should a
lawyer do? What facts or principles are properly relevant to the lawyer’s decision? Is the
regulation a good one, or should the obligation be different – e.g. one of disclosure? If a
lawyer does not disclose the threat, as the rule requires, can the lawyer view her actions
as consistent with a life well-lived? Considering how an ethicist might answer these
different questions indicates, I think, that an answer that views the question from only
one of the proffered perspectives might miss something important but that, as well, which
perspective will be the most relevant and useful depends on which question is asked.
And this is the case regardless of the specific position one takes on the controversies and
debates of the philosophical legal ethics literature.
This is because, as was noted at the outset, philosophical legal ethics exists at the
intersection between the abstraction of philosophy and the tangible problems of the real
world. So that when it answers questions like “what should the lawyer do”, it must
account not only for abstract principles (whatever those may be), but also for how the
person about whom the question is being asked – the lawyer – will be thinking and
feeling in that moment of deciding. Its position on the abstract debate does not eliminate
the tangible manifestation of the questions it is asking (just as the tangible manifestation
does not necessarily indicate the abstract principles necessary to answer the question).
Thus, that a lawyer faced with a suicidal client will consider what the law requires
or permits, suggests that a legal ethicist employing abstract principles to think about what
the lawyer should do must consider the morality of the laws that govern the lawyer’s
conduct. How the legal ethicist considers the morality of laws will properly vary with
the abstract principles the ethicist employs. Ethicist A may emphasize the morality of the
legal system as a whole, including the lawyer’s role within the system, rather than on the
particular law. What the lawyer should do, will simply follow from what the law permits
or requires, provided the legal system is a moral one. Ethicist B may emphasize analysis
of the law without distinction from morality; that ethicist might identify what the lawyer
should do through identifying what the law truly requires, in a Dworkinian sense.
Ethicist C may assess the morality of applying the law so as to preclude disclosure.
Ethicist C’s concern is with the relationship between legality and morality in a particular
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situation where they may be in conflict, and the answer to what the lawyer should do will
depend on whether morality or legality is identified as pre-eminent value in that instance.
One way or another, though, a legal ethicist thinking about what the lawyer should do,
will think about the morality of law. The need to consider the morality of the law follows
from the practical problem posed; how the morality of law is analyzed follows from the
abstract principles embraced.
The lawyer faced with the suicidal client though, will not stop at identifying her
legal obligations. If she has any moral sensitivity or judgment at all, she will go on to
think about the apart-from-legality moral implications of following the law in this
instance. What if the client dies? What if the lawyer could, by one phone call, have
prevented the client from losing what life might have provided, and also prevented injury
to his spouse, children and friends? Those questions will occur to the lawyer, and that
means that they should also occur to and be considered by the legal ethicist who advises
her. What, apart from legality, does morality require in this situation? If ordinary
morality would require disclosure, or some other helping behaviour, then that must have
implications for how the legal ethicist thinks about the problem. That implication will,
again, vary with the abstract principles embraced by the ethicist. Ethicist A may thus
propose the idea of a moral remainder – the irreducible cost that arises from choosing
when personal and professional morality conflict in a particular circumstance. Ethicist B
may simply have incorporated the morality of the lawyer’s act into the Dworkinian
analysis. Ethicist C may argue that the law should be ignored in this particular situation.
But none of A, B or C can assert that the morality of the lawyer’s action plays no part in
the analysis, because the lawyer’s legitimate concern with the morality of non-disclosure
(or disclosure) requires that the ethicist account for it too.
Further, when one thinks about the problem from the perspective of the lawyer, it
may be that some accounts for how morality matters become more compelling than
others. Telling a lawyer about moral remainders, for example, might sound a bit like
saying, “drag, huh?” rather than providing analysis or guidance of use to the lawyer
struggling with the dilemma.
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Finally, if a lawyer (or ethicist) has a position on the morality of suicide per se,
the morality of the client’s conduct in intending to commit suicide may also be a relevant
aspect of the analysis. If the lawyer (or ethicist) believes that suicide is not immoral, but
is rather a matter of personal conscience and choice, or that suicide is permissible in this
instance because the client has a terminal illness and no children, that will affect how the
lawyer perceives the situation and, again, will need to be accounted for by a legal ethicist
analyzing what a lawyer should do if faced with that situation.
What if the question asked of the legal ethicist is, instead, whether the regulation
is a good one, or should be different? In this instance the abstract principles of
philosophy intersect with the concerns of the real world in a different way, with the result
that the shape and necessity of considering different perspectives changes. An ethical
assessment of regulation will consider the morality of law, but not in terms of the
relationship between the morality of law and individual action. The analysis will,
instead, be more jurisprudential. Thus, a formalist approach to the law governing
lawyers, would require considering whether the law in its current form coheres to the
internal rationality of the law governing lawyers. A democratic legitimacy approach
would consider the origins and process of the rule’s enactment. A natural law approach
would consider the relationship between the law and the substantive morality the law is to
reflect. And a positivist approach would simply involve determining whether the rule is
recognizable as law, without much consideration of its morality, one way or another.
Would the morality of the actions of the lawyer or the client be a concern with
this question? It would be in a natural law analysis. But it should also matter for a
formalist or positivist, because laws don’t exist in the air; they apply to real people in real
circumstances, who are affected by their terms. Assessing the validity of a law with clear
moral implications for those to whom it applies without considering the morality of the
actions that would follow from compliance with that law, would be to miss something
important. It may not be as significant as it was with respect to the first question, but it
is still something to be accounted for.

